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SINCE EARLY 1973 the major  price aggregates  have risen far more than 
can be explained  by the direct  effects  of rising  unit labor  costs and higher 
prices for fossil fuels and other imported  commodities.  The margin of 
prices  over  standard  unit labor  costs for private  nonfarm  domestic  output 
widened  not only during  the last phases  of expansion  in 1972-73  but even 
more  sharply  in the recession  that followed.  At today's  price-cost  relation- 
ships, full-employment  levels of output and associated  levels of produc- 
tivity would generate  very large profits.  The full-employment  profit  rate 
(first  cousin  to the full-employment  surplus)  has risen  very  rapidly  during 
the past two years,  accounting  for an important  part of the inflation  and 
perhaps-like its budgetary  cousin-for an important  part  of the recession. 
The behavior  of two major  price  indexes-the deflators  for private  non- 
farm domestic  output and for the gross product  of private  nonfinancial 
corporations-was  compared  to various  measures  of unit labor  costs. But 
first,  each  price  index  was adjusted  to exclude  the effect  of the relative  in- 
crease  in domestic  fossil-fuel  prices  since  the onset  of the embargo  in Octo- 
ber 1973.1  After the adjustment,  each deflator  excluded,  at least concep- 
Note: I am grateful  to James  Becker  and Leonard  Herk for research  assistance,  and 
to members  of the Brookings  panel  for comments  that improved  the quality,  even if they 
added to the length, of this sector report. 
1. George  Perry  has  calculated  the dollar  revenues  of domestic  oil producers  quarterly 
since 1973:2; see Edward  R. Fried and Charles  L. Schultze,  eds., Higher  Oil Prices and 
the World  Economy:  The Adjustmenit  Problem  (Brookings Institution, 1975), chap. 2, 
449 450  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1975 
tually,  the direct  effect of increases  in (1) import  prices;  (2) farm  prices; 
and  (3) domestic  fossil-fuel  prices.  In addition  the deflator  for  the output  of 
private  nonfinancial  corporations  excludes  the prices  of sectors  whose  out- 
put is particularly  hard  to measure,  such as households,  financial  institu- 
tions,  and  most of the residential-rental  sector,  with  its low labor  intensity. 
Prices  in Relation  to Standard  Costs 
Table 1 shows  the ratio of the adjusted  price  deflator  to estimated  stan- 
dard  unit labor costs (SULC) for each of the two sectors.  The standard 
unit  labor  costs were  derived,  in a more  or less simple-minded  way,  by fit- 
ting productivity  in each sector  (quarterly)  to a time trend  plus a cyclical 
term,  the  ratio  of actual  to potential  gross  national  product  in each  quarter. 
In the private  nonfarm  sector  two time trends  are incorporated,  one for 
1954-64  and one for 1965-75,  but the cyclical  adjustment  is constrained  to 
be the same  in both periods.2  This formulation  is clearly  misspecified  with 
respect  to very  short-run  movements,  since  actual  productivity  always  falls 
below trend  in the early  stages  of a recession  by more than the equation 
predicts.  But for movements  of more  than  a few quarters  the equation  cap- 
tures  the cyclical  swings  (see the appendix).  Standard  unit labor  costs are 
then derived  by setting  the ratio of actual  to potential  GNP at 0.97, and 
allowing  only  the  trend  movement  in productivity  to affect  unit  labor  costs; 
an index  of the ratio of prices  to standard  costs, so defined,  for the private 
nonfarm  sector,  is depicted  in figure  1. 
As table  1 shows,  prices  in both  sectors  fell gradually  relative  to standard 
unit  labor  costs during  the period  preceding  the introduction  of wage  and 
table 2-4. A  calculation was made of the excess of the increase in these revenues, 
compared  with what would have occurred  had oil prices  risen at the same rate as the 
private  nonfarm  deflator.  An estimated  increment,  gradually  increasing  over time, was 
added to take account of rising prices  for coal and natural  gas; the increment  equaled 
30 percent  by early 1975. The resulting  dollar value of increased  revenues  accruing  to 
producers  of domestic  fossil fuel was divided  by the current-dollar  value of the private 
nonfarm  GNP to yield the price adjustment.  A correction  was made to eliminate  esti- 
mated revenues of noncorporate  fossil-fuel producers,  and a similar calculation was 
carried  out for the private  nonfinancial  corporate  sector. By early 1975 the adjustment 
lowered the private nonfarm deflator  by 1.5 percent  and the deflator for the private 
nonfinancial  corporate  sector by 1.8 percent. 
2. The data for private  nonfinancial  corporations  are fitted from 1958 on, since the 
data are available  only since then. INr 
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Table  1.  Ratio  of Adjusted Prices  to Standard  Unit  Labor  Costs, 
Private  Nonfarm  and Nonfinancial  Corporate  Sectors,  1965-75a 
Sector 
Year  Private 
and  Private  nionifintancial 
quarter  nonfarm  corporate 
1965  100.1  99.9 
1966  98.6  99.2 
1967  98.7  99.9 
1968  97.0  98.4 
1969  96.8  97.2 
1970  97.0  97.6 
1971:1  97.1  97.4 
2  96.8  97.3 
3  96.6  97.0 
4  96.5  96.9 
1972:1  95.6  96.0 
2  95.3  96.0 
3  95.0  96.0 
4  94.6  95.9 
1973:1  93.4  94.5 
2  93.8  94.8 
3  94.0  95.1 
4  94.2  95.0 
1974:1  95.0  95.8 
2  96.1  96.6 
3  97.3  97.7 
4  98.6  98.6 
1975:1  99.3  98.6 
2  99.0 
Sources: Underlying data on prices, compensation per manhour, and productivity from U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Chartbook  on Prices,  Wages, and Productivity,  various issues. Standard unit labor costs 
were derived as explained in the text. Also  see the text for a description of the adjustment to the price 
indexes. 
a.  The ratios are derived from underlying indexes for which 1967 =  100. 
price  controls  in August 1971. Margins  were  then squeezed  more tightly 
until early 1973, when Phase III was introduced.  In the two subsequent 
years,  however,  the margin  of prices  over  standard  unit labor  costs recov- 
ered  not only the losses  imposed  by price  controls  but all of those suffered 
in the seven  years  since  the mid-1960s.  A substantial  part of the price  rise 
from 1973:  1 to 1975:  1 is attributable  to the increase  in this margin:3 
3. The change  attributable  to the gross  increase  in the margin  is the difference  between 
the actual  price change  and  the  price change  with  a constant percentage markup over 
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Private 
Private  nonfinancial 
nonfarm  corporate 
sector  sector 
Increase  in percentage  markup  over standard 
unit labor costs  7.2  4.9 
Standard  unit labor costs  13.6  12.3 
Domestic  energy  rents  1.7  2.1 
Total percent  change  22.5  19.3 
Most price  equations  that relate  prices  to standard  unit labor  costs also 
assign  a modest  pricing  effect  to deviations  of actual  from  standard  costs. 
To what extent  could the rise in the ratio of price  to standard  unit labor 
costs be due to this effect?  For each of the two sectors  the following  equa- 
tion was fitted  for quarterly  percent  changes  in prices: 
t-3  t-1 
(1)  P,  =  ao +  E  ali SULCi +  E  a2i (AULCi -  SULCQ)  +  Ut, 
i=t  i=t 
where 
P=  price deflator 
SULC =  standard unit labor costs 
A ULC =  actual unit labor costs 
u =  error term. 
All variables  are  expressed  as quarterly  changes  in logarithms;  the private 
nonfarm  sector was fitted from 1954:1 to 1971:3, and the private  non- 
financial  corporate  sector  from 1958:1  to 1971  :3. 
The results  are  shown  in table  2. The purpose  of this particular  equation 
was  not to determine  either  the best  structural  or the most  useful  predictive 
relationship  but to capture  the historical  behavior  of prices  relative  to unit 
labor  costs. The data  were  fitted  only through  the third  quarter  of 1971  to 
avoid  incorporating  the effect  either  of price  controls  or of the increase  in 
the gross  margin  since  their  removal. 
In table 3, the movement  of prices  since the quarter  immediately  pre- 
ceding  price  controls  (1971:2) is compared  to an extrapolation  based on 
the equations  on unit labor cost. (The actual  prices  have again been ad- 
justed to remove  the effect of increases  in the relative  price of domestic 
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Table  2. Estimates  of Equation  (1), Private  Nonfarm  and 
Nonfinancial  Corporate  Sectorsa 
Sector 
Private 
Private  nonfinancial 
nonfarm  corporate 
Variableb  and 
summary  statistic  Parameter  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Variable 
Constant  ao  0.126  ...  0.074  ... 
SULC  a,  (t)  0.231  4.6  0.312  5.2 
(t-1)  0.202  8.5  0.231  8.4 
(t-2)  0.173  6.8  0.150  5.1 
(t-3)  0.145  2.7  0.069  1.1 
Mali  0.751  10.1  0.762  9.1 
(AULC-SULC)  a2  (t)  0.141  3.8  0.149  3.9 
(t-1)  0.049  1.3  0.079  2.2 
Za2i  0.190  ...  0.228  ... 
Summary  statistic 
RI  0.66  0.68 
Durbin-Watson  2.036  2.011 
Source: Text equation (1). 
a.  Period of fit: nonfarm, 1954:1-1971:3;  nonfinancial corporate, 1958:1-1971:3. 
b. SULC  =  standard unit labor costs; AULC =  average unit labor costs. The variables are expressed 
as quarterly  changes in logarithms. 
During  the  period  of effective  price  controls,  between  1971:2  and 1973:  1, 
the price of value added had risen in the private  nonfarm  economy by 
about 1?/2  percent  less, and in the private  nonfinancial  corporate  sector  by 
about 1 percent  less, than could have been predicted  on the basis of the 
behavior  of unit labor costs. By the end of 1973  that shortfall  had been 
wiped  out in both sectors.  Over  the two-year  period  from  the end of effec- 
tive  price  controls  to early  1975,  prices  for nonfarm  products  rose  20.7  per- 
cent  compared  with  a rise  of only 12.6  percent  predicted  by the equation  on 
unit labor costs. In the nonfinancial  corporate  sector  the actual  increase 
was 17.2  percent  compared  with  the predicted  11.5  percent  rise. 
Reasons  for Recent  Movements 
Nothing  in the analysis  itself  suggests  the reasons  for the recent  behavior 
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Table 3.  Comparison  of Actual  Ratio  of Prices  to Standard  Unit  Labor 
Costs  with Estimates  from Equation  (1),  Private  Nonfarm  and 
Nonfinancial  Corporate  Sectors,  Quarterly,  1971-75 
Sector 
Private  nonfinancial 
Private  nonfarm  corporate 
Actual  Estimated  Actual  Estimated 
Period  indexes  inidexes  inidexes  indexes 
Price indexes  (1971:2 =  100) 
1971:2  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
3  100.7  100.8  100.5  100.7 
4  100.8  101.6  100.6  101.2 
1972:1  101.9  102.6  101.6  102.0 
2  102.2  103.4  101.8  102.6 
3  102.6  104.1  102.2  103.1 
4  103.4  105.0  102.8  103.6 
1973:1  104.3  106.0  103.5  104.4 
2  105.7  107.2  104.7  105.4 
3  107.0  108.5  105.9  106.6 
4  108.9  110.0  107.1  107.8 
1974:1  111.7  111.6  109.3  109.3 
2  115.5  113.4  112.5  110.9 
3  119.0  115.3  115.6  112.7 
4  122.8  117.4  118.7  114.6 
1975:1  125.9  119.4  121.3  116.4 
Percent  changes 
1971:2-1973:1  4.3  6.0  3.5  4.4 
1973:1-1974:1  7.1  5.3  5.6  4.7 
1973:1-1975:1  20.7  12.6  17.2  11.5 
Source: Actual, table 1; estimated, text equation (1). 
controls  the behavior  of prices  relative  to unit  labor  costs supports  Robert 
Gordon's  1973  findings  that Phase  II price  and wage  controls  did squeeze 
margins.4  It seems  eminently  reasonable  to attribute  the initial  rise  in prices 
relative  to unit labor  costs during  1973  to the gradual  dismantling  of con- 
trols.  And some of the further  expansion  in the margin  during  1974  might 
be ascribed  to fears  of renewed  imposition  of price  and  wage  controls.  But 
the magnitude  of the expansion,  and its continuation  in the face of over- 
whelming  congressional  hostility  to a reimposition  of controls  and of the 
4. Robert  J. Gordon, "The  Response of Wages  and Prices  to the First  Two Years of 
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sharpest  sag  in aggregate  demand  since  the 1930s,  suggests  that  much  more 
was involved  than the simple  fear of future  controls.  Several  hypotheses 
can be offered. 
INCREASES IN  IMPORT PRICES 
As Gordon  points  out, the structurally  expected  effect  of increases  in im- 
port prices  in eliciting  sympathetic  rises in prices  of competing  domestic 
products  cannot  be coaxed  from  the time-series  data  prior  to 1973  because 
the  variance  in the relative  price  of imports  was so small  during  the period. 
It is hard  to believe,  however,  that the sharp  rise in import  prices  (apart 
from  food and fuel)  beginning  in 1973  did not elicit  significant  price  gains 
among  competing  domestic  products.  So long as the relative  price  of com- 
petitive  imports  does  not fall  (through  differential  price  behavior  abroad  or 
dollar  appreciation),  and so long as unit labor  costs do not rise to fill the 
gap, a disequilibrium  remains,  in the sense  that the full-employment  profit 
rate  will remain  above  "normal."  (In a deep  recession  like the current  one, 
this  fact  may  be hidden  by the  cyclical  depression  of actual  productivity  and 
the corresponding  rise  in actual  unit labor  costs-hence the kinship  of the 
full-employment  profit  rate  and  the full-employment  budget  surplus,  noted 
above.) 
THE RISING  COST OF CAPITAL  GOODS 
The price  equations  set out earlier  incorporate,  during  the period  of fit, 
a very slight  downward  trend  in the ratio of price  to standard  unit labor 
costs. In the private  nonfarm  sector,  standard  unit labor  costs represented 
56.5 percent  of price  in 1967.  The price  equation  implies  that apart  from 
cyclical  variations,  prices  will rise  by 0.5 percent  per year  plus  0.75 percent 
for each 1 percent  rise  in standard  unit  labor  costs. On a steady-state  basis 
this  means  that  whenever  standard  unit  labor  costs  rise  by more  than  2 per- 
cent  per year,  prices  will increase  by less than that rise.  The "break-even" 
point for the nonfinancial  corporate  sector  is a 1.3 percent  annual  rise in 
standard  unit labor  costs. Obviously,  this is not a well-specified  structural 
relationship.  In a sustained  period  of very  much  larger  rises  in standard  unit 
labor  costs, or when prices  of capital  goods rise significantly  faster  than 
standard  unit labor  costs, the relationships  of price  to unit labor  cost im- 
plied  in the equations  clearly  will not hold up. Charles  L. Schultze  457 
In the purely  competitive  world,  a sustained  and rapid  rise in prices  of 
capital  goods would  tend to reduce  the marginal  efficiency  of investment 
to the  point  where  capacity  expansion  was slowed  relative  to the growth  of 
demand  (under  conditions  of full  employment).  Prices  would  then  rise  rela- 
tive to standard  unit labor costs by enough  to restore  rates of return  on 
investment.  In a world  of administrative  pricing  rules,  in which  prices  are 
increased  as standard  direct  costs  rise  but some  attention  is paid  to a target 
rate  of return,  an acceleration  of inflation  would  likely  initiate  the following 
sequence: 
First,  the old pricing  rules,  relating  prices  to standard  direct  costs,  would 
be followed. 
Second,  this  practice  would  depress  the margin  of prices  relative  to stan- 
dard  unit labor  costs, and yield a decreasing  rate of return  to new invest- 
ment,  since  capital-goods  prices  would  begin  to rise  faster  than  the rate  of 
increase  in the nonlabor  returns  per unit of output. 
Third,  rather  than waiting  for the classical  long-run  adjustment  to take 
place through  the slowdown of capacity  expansion,  price policy in the 
dominant  administered-price  sector  would  be adjusted  to correct  margins 
for the inadequacy  of historical  pricing  rules. 
Fourth, this development  would reverse  the downdrift  of the ratio of 
price  to standard  unit labor  costs and restore  it to earlier  levels. 
To get some impression  of the potential  magnitude  of price  changes  re- 
lated to capital  recovery,  I have constructed  a price  series  for the private 
nonfinancial  corporate  sector  based on a set of pricing  rules designed  to 
yield, at standard  output  volune, an unchanged  rate of return  to capital, 
priced  at reproduction  costs.  This  series  was  concocted,  using  1969  as a base 
year,  by setting  prices  so as (1) to recover  standard  unit  labor  costs; (2) to 
recover  that fraction  of the deviation  of actual  from standard  unit labor 
costs implied  in the price  equation  discussed  earlier;  (3) to recover  indirect 
taxes  per  unit  of output  (with  a small  adjustment  to allow  recovery  of prop- 
erty  taxes  at standard  volumes  of output);  (4) to recover,  at standard  vol- 
umes of output,  the 1969  capital  costs per unit (net interest,  depreciation, 
and profits)  extrapolated  by the price  deflator  for nonresidential  fixed  in- 
vestment. 
Assuming  a constant  ratio  of capital  stock  to capacity  output  and  a con- 
stant real interest  rate, the resultant  price  level would yield, at standard 
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Table  4. Actual,  Fitted,  and  Simulated  Prices,  Costs,  and  Gross  Margins 
per  Unit of Output,  Private  Nonfinancial  Corporate  Sector, 
Selected  Periods,  1969-75 
Price 
Price component  chanige  Cyclical 
from  absorption 
Unit  previous incorporated 
labor  Indirect  Gross  period  in gross 
Period  and item  costs  taxes  margins  Total  (percent)  margin 
1969 (base)  65.7  9.4  24.9  100.0  ...  -0.2 
1971:2 
Target-rate-of-return 
simulation  71.3  10.8  27.1  109.2  9.2 
Actual  71.3  10.8  26.0  108.1  8.1  o  0.4 
Fitted  71.3  10.8  24.7  106.8  6.8 
1973:1 
Target-rate-of-return 
simulation  73.8  10.5  29.7  114.0  4.4 
Actual  73.8  10.5  27.7  112.0  3.6  -1.2 
Fitted  73.8  10.5  27.2  111.5  4.4 
1975:1 
Target-rate-of-return 
simulation  89.8  12.7  31.9  134.4  17.8 
Actual  89.8  12.7  28.6  131.1l  17.1  .  3.5 
Fitted  89.8  12.7  21.9  124.4  11.6  J 
Sources: Actual, table 1; fitted, table 3; simulation, see text; all data converted to indexes, 1969 =  100. 
a.  The actual total price for 1975:1 was adjusted by 1.8 percent to exclude increases in energy prices. 
reproduction  costs.5  The  realized  capital  recovery  per  unit of output  would 
vary  from  the target  by the absorption  of cyclical  variations  in unit labor 
costs. 
The results  of this simulation-in terms  of prices  and costs-are  shown 
in table  4. They  are  also compared  both  with  actual  prices  and  margins  and 
with  those  implied  in the pre-1971  fitted  relationship  of prices  to unit  labor 
costs. 
In the roughly  two years  between  1969  and  the quarter  just preceding  the 
5. The price-cost  relationships  would generate  (1) a return  on new investment  equal 
to the 1969 return  on invested  capital; and (2) a series of "capital  gains" sufficient  to 
recover  the difference  between  real  and nominal  rates  if the excess  of the nominal  interest 
rate over the real rate correctly  anticipated  the rate of inflation. Charles  L. Schultze  459 
imposition  of price  controls,  actual  prices  rose more than the calculated 
value  from  the labor-cost  equation  and  somewhat  less  than  the target-rate- 
of-return  simulation.  After two years of controls, prices had risen by 
slightly  less  than  either  the  labor-cost  equation  or the target-rate  simulation 
suggested.  In the succeeding  two years,  however,  the rises  in the actual  and 
simulated  indexes  were  virtually  the same  and much  larger  than  predicted 
by the labor-cost  equation. 
A REDUCTION  IN  EXPECTED OUTPUT  LEVELS 
To the extent  that  pricing  decisions  are  made  with  a target  rate  of return 
in mind,  changes  in expectations  about  the long-run  average  rate  of capac- 
ity utilization  could affect  the markup  of prices  over standard  unit labor 
costs. If both average expected  output  and  peak expected  output  fall (and 
by the same  amount),  there  should  be no effect  on margins,  since  the fall  in 
average  expected  output  would be matched  by a fall in capacity  require- 
ments.  But  if average  expected  output  falls  by more  than  peak  expected  out- 
put, gross  capital  returns  per unit of output  will have to rise to yield the 
target  rate of return  on investment. 
Figure  2 traces  a twenty-quarter  moving  average  of the ratio  of actual  to 
potential  GNP. While this is hardly  the most sophisticated  indicator,  its 
movements  should  provide  some  measure  of long-run  changes  in expected 
utilization  levels. To the extent  that rules of thumb  in pricing  policy are 
influenced  by the target  rate of return,  an increase  in expected  utilization 
rates  should  lower,  and a decrease  should  raise,  the ratio of price  to stan- 
dard  unit labor  costs. 
A Test of the Hypotheses 
To the extent  that the hypotheses  discussed  above  are  valid,  the ratio of 
price to standard  unit labor costs should be influenced  by the following 
factors:  The long-run  factors  are the relative  price  of capital  goods (posi- 
tive),  and  the long-run  expected  rate  of capacity  utilization  (negative).  The 
short-run  factors  are  the deviation  of actual  from  standard  unit  labor  costs 
(positive),  and  the ratio  of current  to long-run  expected  capacity  utilization 
(positive,  reflecting  the state of excess  demand). ON 
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The following  equation  was fitted to the quarterly  ratio of prices to 
standard  unit labor  costs for the private  nonfarm  sector: 
Pt_  (A ULC\  [y  (*  (2)  SuLtC 
=  aO +  al  SULC)t  +  a2  [p-(yp  ] 
+  a3 (1)  +  a4  +  a5t +  a6D  +  ut, 
where 
P  =  price deflator (1967 =  1.00) 
A ULC =  actual unit labor costs (1967 =  1.00) 
SULC =  standard unit labor costs 
t  =  time  (1958:4  =  1) 
y  =  actual GNP 
yp =  potential GNP 
(Y/YP)*  = five-year  moving  average  of y/yp 
(PI/P)* =  one-year  moving  average  of the  relative  price  of business  fixed 
investment 
D  =  price-control dummy (1971:3-1974:1  =  1.0; 0 otherwise) 
u =  error term. 
Two forms  of the equation  were  tried,  one using  the lagged  value  of the 
dependent  variable,  the other  using  independent  lag structures  and a rho 
correction.  In addition,  both sets of equations  were  fitted  first  to the  period 
1958:4 to  1971:2 and then to the longer period 1958:4 to  1974:1. The 
basic results are shown in table 5. The coefficient on the relative price of 
capital  goods was in no case significant,  and was of the wrong  sign.  All of 
the equations  in table  5 were  refitted  without  it. 
Various  lag structures  were  tried  for alternative  B, the equations  without 
the lagged  dependent  variable.  In all cases the coefficients  on the lagged 
values  of deviations  of actual  from standard  unit labor costs and on the 
lagged  values of the demand  term were highly insignificant,  and clearly 
"interfered"  with  each other.  The measure  of expected  long-term  capacity 
utilization  (y/yp)* is itself a twenty-quarter  moving  average  and needs  no 
lag. Only  the price-control  dummy  seemed  to require  a lag structure.  Since 
the margin-squeezing  effect  of price  controls  operated  through  delays  and 
refusals  to allow a full cost passthrough,  a constant  degree of control 
would  result  in a gradual  squeezing  of margins,  at least  for a while,  as costs 
rose. Relaxing  the severity  of controls  could imply  a maintenance  of the 
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easing  of controls  that accompanied  the introduction  of Phase  III in early 
1973  need  not have  implied  a widening  of margins,  only a cessation  of the 
previously  tightening  squeeze).  Finally, abandonment  of controls  should 
have led to a gradual  restoration  of margins.  A four-quarter,  first-order 
Almon  lag was chosen,  and, as expected,  the negative  coefficients  on the 
constant  dummy  term  increased  in value over  the four quarters. 
The  lower  bank  of data  in table  5 compares  the steady-state  coefficients 
from  alternative  A with the coefficient  values  and the sum of the dummy 
coefficients  from  alternative  B. Except  for  the  version  of alternative  A fitted 
through  1974:1,  the effects  of deviations  in actual  unit labor  costs and of 
long-term  changes  in capacity  utilization  are  virtually  the same.  About 60 
percent  of any deviation  in actual  from  standard  unit  labor  costs is passed 
through  into prices. (Unit labor costs are approximately  57 percent  of 
prices;  0.35/0.57 =  0.61.)  This  effect  of deviations  in actual  from  standard 
unit  labor  costs is somewhat  higher  than those observed  by others,  which 
tend  to take  on a value  of 0.2 rather  than  the  0.35 in the current  equations.6 
But, as shown below, the current  estimate  holds up well when  projected 
past  the fitting  period. 
In the  equation  with  the  lagged  dependent  variable  fitted  through  1974:  1, 
the price-control  dummy  probably  forces the coefficient  on the lagged 
dependent  variable  to an artificially  high level, given the hypothesis  sug- 
gested  above  that the initial  effect  of price  controls  was  to squeeze  margins 
gradually.7  In turn  this blows  up the steady-state  coefficient  on the ratio  of 
A  ULC  to SULC  to an excessively  high number.  (Since  the (y/yp)* term  is 
a smooth  long-lagged  variable,  its raw coefficient  value adjusts  to the rise 
in the  coefficient  on the lagged  dependent  variable,  so its steady-state  value 
is not so much  distorted.) 
The  coefficient  on long-term  capacity  utilization  implies  that a 1 percent 
reduction  in long-term  expectations  about the utilization  rate results  in a 
0.35  to 0.40  percent  price  increase.  This  result  is slightly  above  what  would 
be predicted  by a target-rate-of-return  hypothesis.  Capital-recovery  costs, 
in normal  times,  are  27 percent  of price  in the corporate  sector;  a 1 percent 
"permanent"  drop in capacity  utilization  would therefore  require  a 0.27 
percent  change  in price  to maintain  the rate of return  on invested  capital 
unchanged,  compared  with  the 0.35 to 0.40 percent  change  implied  by the 
equations. 
6. See Gordon,  "Response  of Wages  and Prices." 
7. If the dummy  is constant,  its gradual  impact on margins  can be reflected  only by 
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Table 5.  Results of Alternative  Estimates of Equation (2) 
Alternative  Ab  Alternative  Bb 
Equation  with  lagged  Equation  without  lagged 
dependent  variable  dependent  variable 
Variablea 
and  Fitted  Fitted  Fitted  Fitted 
summary  through  through  through  through 
statistic  1974:1  1971:2  1974:1  1971:2 
Coefficient  and t-statistic 
Variable 
Constant  0.298  1.6  0.712  3.3  1.044  7.2  1.050  8.0 
AULC/SULC  0.224  3.1  0.242  3.3  0.345  3.8  0.347  3.8 
[y/yp -  (y/yp)*]  0.046  1.0  0.061  1.4  0.033  0.5  0.073  1.3 
(y/yp)*  -0.127  2.0  -0.264  3.6  -0.390  4.3  -0.399  5.6 
t  -0.0003  2.9  -0.0004  4.3  -0.0006  5.2  -0.0006  6.0 
T2Dt  ...  ...-0.023  4.9  ... 
(t)  -0.007  2.2  ...  -0.004  1.3  ... 
(t  -  1)  ...  ...  -0.005  3.3  ... 
(t-2)  ...  ...  -0.006  4.3  ... 
(t-  3)  ...  ...  -0.008  2.6  ... 
(P/SULC)_1  0.606  6.5  0.309  2.5  ...  ... 
Rho  ...  ...  0.642  0.507 
Steady-state  value  of coefficient 
A  ULC/SULC  0.569  0.350  0.345  0.347 
[y/yp-(y/yp)*]  0.117  0.088  0.033  0.073 
(y/yp)*  -0.322  -0.382  -0.390  -0.399 
t  -0.0008  -0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0006 
D  -0.0178  ...  -0.023  ... 
Summary  statistic  Value  of summnary  measuire 
R2  0.975  0.964  0.891c  0.942c 
Durbin-Watson  2.036  1.742  1.950  1.877 
Standard  error  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.003 
a. AULC = actual unit  labor costs;  SULC = standard unit  labor costs;  y/yp  =  ratio of  actual  to 
potential GNP,  and * signifies five-year moving average; t = time; D  =  price-control dummy; P  =  price 
deflator. 
b. The fitting period for all four versions of the equation begins in 1958:4. 
c.  Dynamic  k2. 
The demand  term is small and in no case significant,  although  it does 
carry  the "right"  sign.  Quite  possibly,  however,  a gradual  demand  effect  is 
being  roughly  offset  by a growing  effect  on price  of the A  ULC/SULC term. 
Since  movements  in A  ULC/SULC are dominated  by cyclical  productivity 
changes,  which in turn are negatively  correlated  with demand,  the two 
effects  tend to cancel  out.8 
8. But see the discussion  of productivity  in the appendix. 464  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
Table  6. Actual  and  Predicted  Values  of the Ratio  of Prices  to Standard 
Unit  Labor  Costs,  Private  Nonfarm  Sector,  Quarterly, 
1974:2  to 1975:2 
Year  antd  Actual  Predicted  Error 
quarter  (1)  (2)  (1) -  (2) 
1974:2  96.1  96.4  -0.3 
3  97.3  97.0  0.3 
4  98.6  98.0  0.6 
1975:1  99.3  99.0  0.3 
2  99.0  99.3  -0.3 
Sources: Actual values, table 1; predicted values, alternative  B of text equation (2) fitted through 1974: 1. 
Table  6 compares  the actual  values  of P/SULC during  1974:2  to 1975:2 
with values predicted  from the alternative  B equation, fitted through 
1974:  1. The equation  predicts  the upsurge  in margins  very well. And al- 
though  the removal  of price  controls  contributed  about  40 percent  of the 
rise  (which  any equation  with a lagged  dummy  term  might  have approxi- 
mated),  changes  in several  of the other  variables  are quite  important. 
Table  7 shows  the factors  that contributed  to the rise in P/SULC over 
the past two years-from its low point in 1973:2  to 1975:2.9 
The findings  might  now be summarized  as follows: 
1. Long-term  changes  in expected  capacity  utilization  affect prices  by 
slightly  more than would  be expected  if pricing  based on a target  rate of 
return  were  common. 
2. About 60 percent  of cost changes  stemming  from  cyclical  changes  in 
productivity  are passed  on in prices. 
3. Changes  in the degree  of excess  capacity  have little  effect  on margins 
(whatever  they may do to wages).  The close relationship  between  cyclical 
changes  in actual unit labor costs and in excess capacity,  however,  may 
obscure  two distinct  but offsetting  effects:  lagged  cyclical  changes  in actual 
unit  labor  costs  tending  to raise  prices  and  lagged  demand  changes  tending 
to lower  them. 
4. Price  controls  appear  to have gradually  reduced  prices  by 2 to 21/2 
percent. 
About  40 percent  of the sharp  rise  in prices  relative  to standard  unit  labor 
costs over  the past two years  appears  to have been due to the removal  of 
9. Actually,  there is a sudden one-quarter  dip in P/SULC in 1973:1 not picked up 
in the equation  (see figure 1). This dip was ignored  in choosing the low point. Charles  L. Schultze  465 
Table 7.  Factors Contributing  to the Rise in the Ratio of Prices 
to Standard  Unit Labor Costs, Private Nonfarm Sector, 
1973:2 to 1975:2 
Percentage  points 
Componenit  of rise  Rise 
Total rise in P/S ULC  5.21 
Deviation in actual unit labor costs  2.48 
Removal of price  controls  2.30 
Reduction in long-term  capacity  utilization  1.08 
Time trend  -0.48 
Falling demand  -0.36 
Residual  and rho correction  0.19 
Source: Estimated from alternative B of text equation (2), fitted through 1974:1. 
controls.  Almost all of the remainder,  paradoxically,  stems from the net 
impact  of sharply  declining  levels of economic  activity,  through  the effect 
of cyclical  declines  in productivity  and a fall in expectations  about long- 
term  capacity  utilization.  However  successful  it may  be in moderating  wage 
inflation,  depression  of aggregate  demand-especially  if continued  for long 
periods-appears  to be counterproductive  in its effects  on price-wage  mar- 
gins.  The  large  margin-raising  effects  of reduced  aggregate  demand  are  not 
apparent  to the naked eye in prior recessions  principally  because  those 
recessions  were  neither  as sharp  nor as long as the current  one. 
Could other  potential  culprits  be responsible  for the recent  rise in price 
margins-the competitive  effects of rising  import  prices,  the fear of the 
reimposition  of controls,  and escalating  expectations  of long-term  infla- 
tion?  Have one or more  of the independent  variables  used in equation  (2) 
recently  taken on values out of line with past experience,  thereby  serving 
as surrogates  for a dummy  variable  that picks  up one of the factors  cited 
above?  The fact  that  the version  of the equation  fitted  through  1971  :2 has 
virtually  the same  coefficients  as the version  fitted  through  1974:  1 means 
that the structure  captured  in that equation  could fully predict  the recent 
rise in margins (after adjustment for the removal of price controls). Hence 
the  explanation  relying  on a surrogate  dummy  variable  will  not hold.  To the 
extent  that some factor  other  than  those included  in equation  (2) drove  up 
price margins,  some offsetting  change  in the earlier  structure  must have 
occurred  simultaneously.  On balance  it seems  more probable  that the ex- 
tent and depth  of the recent  depression  in aggregate  demand,  operating  on 
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Implications  for the Future 
What  does  the foregoing  imply  for the movement  of the ratio  of price  to 
standard  unit labor costs if a rapid  recovery  takes place during  the next 
eighteen  months?  Using the alternative  B equation  fitted  through  1974:1, 
I have made a projection  based on several  simple  assumptions:  (1) real 
GNP rises  at a steady  8 percent  annual  rate  starting  in the third  quarter  of 
1975;  (2) compensation  per manhour  in the private  nonfarm  sector also 
rises at an 8 percent  annual  rate; and (3) productivity  behaves  in accor- 
dance  with  the equation  discussed  earlier  (in the second  quarter  of 1975  the 
residual  from  that equation  was virtually  zero). Given  these  assumptions, 
the ratio of prices  to standard  unit labor  costs remains  virtually  constant, 
in the neighborhood  of 99.0 through  the end of 1976.  The favorable  effect 
of the decline  in actual  relative  to standard  unit  labor  costs  is fully  offset  by 
the continued  fall in the long-term  moving  average  of the capacity-utiliza- 
tion variable  and the rise  in the current  capacity-utilization  term. 
Several  additional  points should be noted. First, the trend  rate of in- 
crease  in productivity  incorporated  in the SULC  variable  is only 2 percent 
per  year,  somewhat  less  than  usually  assumed.10  Hence,  an 8 percent  rise  in 
compensation  per  manhour  translates  into a 6 percent  rise  in standard  unit 
labor  costs. Second,  the cyclical  productivity  adjustment  tends systemati- 
cally  to understate  the fall  in productivity  during  the early  downturn  and  to 
overstate  the rise  during  the early  upturn.  The  drop  in A  ULC/SULC  in the 
projection  may, therefore,  be understated  and P/SULC slightly  overesti- 
mated  during  the next four quarters. 
The central  point of the projections  is that the nonfarm  price deflator 
(excluding  domestic  energy  rents)  is likely  to be determined  mainly  by wage 
changes  during  the early phases of the recovery.  While this is hardly  a 
10. The growth rate of productivity  between 1955:4 and 1965:4, in both of which 
y/yp was the same, was 2.61 percent;  the equation  shows a 2.55 percent  trend for this 
period. Productivity  growth between 1965:2 and 1973:1 (also periods with the same 
y/yp) was 2.15 percent; the equation has a  1.95 percent trend for this period. The 
difference  between  the peak-to-peak  growth in productivity  is almost exactly the same 
as the difference  between  the two trends  in the equation.  An equation  fitted with only 
one trend yields a 2.2 percent  trend for the entire period,  and a slightly larger  cyclical 
adjustment  term (0.47 instead of 0.42). An equation using two time trends, and, as a 
cyclical variable,  lagged changes in output relative  to trend, also yields a 2.0 percent 
productivity  trend for the recent period  (see the appendix). Charles  L. Schultze  467 
startling  conclusion,  it implies  a sharp  departure  from the price  behavior 
of the past two years. 
One of the major  features  of the 1973-74  downturn  was the erosion  in 
real  wages,  which  led to a sharp  fall  in real  disposable  personal  income.  The 
role in this phenomenon  of rising prices for oil and other imports  has 
long been  recognized.  But the rise  in the ratio of prices  to wages  has been 
much  larger  than can be accounted  for by these  developments.  To the ex- 
tent that the steady-state  coefficients  on A  ULC/SULC  and on long-term 
expectations  about  utilization  derived  earlier  approximate  structural  real- 
ity, sharp  and  prolonged  recessions  tend  to raise  prices  significantly  relative 
to standard  unit  labor  costs.  Whatever  an extended  depression  of aggregate 
demand  does to wage  rates,  it is not an effective  way of squeezing  price- 
wage  margins. 
APPENDIX 
Derivation  of Trend  Productivity  Increase 
to Calculate  Standard  Unit  Labor  Costs 
FOR BOTH  sectors,  private  nonfarm  and private  nonfinancial  corporate, 
output per employee hour (Q/H)  was fitted to a time trend and a cyclical 
adjustment  term  (the  ratio  of actual  to potential  GNP, y/yp). Productivity 
data are indexed  to 1967 =  100. 
The regression  for private  nonfarm  productivity  is 
(A-1)  In (Q) = 4.281 D1  +  4.339 D2  +  0.00639  D1(t) 
\Ht  (1212)  (332)  (58) 
+  0.00487 D2(t) +  0.419 ln(2) 
(24)  (10) 
R2  =  0.994; Durbin-Watson  statistic =  0.339. 
where 
D,  =  1, 1954: 1-1965:4;  0 otherwise 
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The  regression  for productivity  in the private  nonfinancial  corporate  sector 
is 
(A-2)  In (  4.300 +  0.00725(t) +  0.503 In(2). 
(1222)  (100)  (12) 
R1 = 0.994; Durbin-Watson  statistic = 0.367. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
Standard  unit  labor  costs  are  estimated  by setting  y/yp at a constant  0.97, 
calculating  a standard  productivity,  and dividing  that into the actual  com- 
pensation  per hour. Since  two time trends  (with different  intercepts)  were 
used  in the private  nonfarm  sector,  a discontinuity  in the measurement  of 
standard  productivity  was avoided  by locating  the intersection  of the two 
productivity  trends  (1963:2)  and switching  from one trend  to the other  at 
that point. 
An alternative  productivity  equation  was tried  for the private  nonfarm 
sector,  in which  quarterly  changes  in productivity  were  fitted  against  two 
time  trends  and a lagged  series  of quarterly  changes  in actual  output  rela- 
tive to potential: 
(A-3)  A ln (H)  =  aoD,  +  a1D2  +  a2A  In (2L) 
+  a3iA In  +  ut, 
where 
D,  =  1, 1956-65; 0 otherwise 
D2 =  1, 1966-75;  0 otherwise. 
The results  of (A-3) are given in table A-1; the coefficients  aO and a, are 
expressed  as annual  rates  of change,  in percent,  and  the weighting  structure 
for the sum of the a3s  is from a second-order  Almon lag. 
For purposes  of this  paper  the important  point  is the confirmation  of the 
2 percent  value for the recent  time trend.  The results  are also interesting 
for what  they say about cyclical  productivity  change.  For each 1 percent 
drop  in output  below  trend,  productivity  at first  drops  0.6 percent.  If out- 
put then  resumes  a movement  parallel  to trend,  three-quarters  of the pro- 
ductivity  shortfall  will be made  up after  six quarters,  in what  is virtually  a 
declining  geometric  pattern.  (Since  a second-order  Almon  lag was  imposed, 
a geometric  decline  is not forced  upon  the weighting  structure.)  A freely  fit- Charles  L. Schultze  469 
ted lag structure  gave virtually the same coefficients  for the first quarter  and 
the sum of the remaining five quarters (0.62;  -0.46).  An  eight-quarter 
Almon lag, for quarters after the current one,  also gave similar results 
(0.59; -0.46),  but the negative coefficients deteriorated rapidly in signifi- 
cance after the fourth quarter, and the sum of the negative weights was no 
greater than that in the five-quarter  structure. 
Table A-1.  Results of Estimates of Equation (A-3) 
Coefficient and 
summary statistic  Value  t-statistic 
Coefficient 
ao  2.59  8.0 
a,  2.02  5.7 
a2  0.613  10.5 
Maus  -0.452  4.6 
(a3, -1)  -0.165  2.7 
(a3, -2)  -0.117  4.2 
(a3,  -3)  -0.080  2.1 
(a3,  -4)  -0.053  1.9 
(a3,  -5)  -0.037  0.7 
Summary  statistic 
P2  0.622  .. 
Durbin-Watson  1.875  ... 
Discussion 
Most of the discussion focused on the interpretation of the recent be- 
havior of the ratio of price to standard unit labor cost (P/SULC).  R. A. 
Gordon introduced the possibility that the observed widening of the price- 
cost margin since early 1973 could reflect a shift in thinking on the part of 
firms from historical to anticipated standard unit labor costs. In an infla- 
tionary period, the ratio of price to historical cost would rise even though 
the ratio of price to anticipated cost was constant. William Nordhaus sus- 
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as the result  of an insufficient  adjustment  for increases  in energy  prices. 
Schultze's  adjustment  seemed  distinctly  smaller  than similar  estimates  by 
John Shoven and Nordhaus,  which had indicated  a marked-up  rise of 
roughly  $2 in final  energy-product  prices  for each $1 increase  in the cost of 
crude  oil. Any understatement  of the energy  effect  would  overstate  the rise 
of P/SULC to be explained  by other  causes.  Nordhaus  also noted  that the 
turnaround  in the margin  coincided  approximately  with the 1973 Mid- 
east war. 
More  generally,  Nordhaus  was uncomfortable  with  the implicit  assump- 
tion of the paper  that  pricing  behavior  is based  solely  on labor  costs.  What 
appears  as an enlarged  markup  of value-added  prices  over  labor  costs  since 
1973  in reality  might  be a constant  markup  on both labor and materials 
costs, following  a major  relative  increase  in materials  costs. Robert  Hall 
elaborated  on that  criticism.  He noted  that  the price  measure  of the paper, 
the private  nonfarm  deflator,  was a value-added  price  index  which  neces- 
sarily  abstracted  from  two major  nonwage  sources  of the recent  inflation, 
farm  and  import  prices.  He would  have  preferred  a measure  of the price  of 
final  goods rather  than of value  added. 
Schultze  replied  that his analysis  was based  implicitly  on a model with 
a long-run  target  rate  of return,  for which the adjusted  deflator  was the 
appropriate  price measure.  A more inclusive  price measure  would raise 
aggregation  problems  in interpreting  pricing  behavior  as aiming  at a target 
rate  of return  based  on a markup  over  all costs.  He thought  it unlikely  that 
pricing  rules  at the initial  stage  of processing  would  mark  up very  volatile 
prices  of raw materials;  at more advanced  stages  of processing,  the raw- 
materials  component  of costs might  be incorporated  in a pricing  rule,  but 
would  be less volatile.  A value-added  deflator  finesses  some of these  prob- 
lems. George  Perry  viewed  the aggregation  problem  as less important  for 
the broad  private  nonfarm  sector, which acquires  most of its purchased 
inputs  from industries  within  the sector, than it would be for a smaller 
sector  or a particular  industry. 
William  Feilner  suggested  that, if, in fact, firms  were  passing  on their 
tax burden  from FIFO inventory  accounting,  that would show up as a 
widening  of margins  that the equation  might  wrongly  attribute  to the gap 
between  standard  and actual  productivity.  Robert  Solow called  attention 
to Schultze's  two-part  explanation  of the drop in the P/SULC margin 
between  1960 and 1971,  which  invoked  a negative-time  trend  and an in- 
crease  in the expected  long-run  rate of capacity  utilization.  Solow sus- Charles  L. Schultze  471 
pected  that  the large  negative-trend  effect  might  in fact  reflect  the influence 
of some omitted  structural  variable. 
Christopher  Sims expressed  doubts that Schultze's  equation  could be 
confidently  interpreted  as reflecting  pricing behavior.  It could instead 
describe  wage behavior,  since the estimated  equation  approximates  a re- 
lationship  involving  the reciprocals  of the real  wage,  of output  per worker, 
and  of output.  It could  be saying  something  about  the  production  function, 
since  transposing  output  per worker  to the left-hand  side of the equation 
and the real wage to the right yields an equation  that could be used to 
estimate  the elasticity  of substitution.  Finally,  it could  be saying  something 
about the stability of relative  shares-that the ratio of total wages to 
nominal  income  tends  to be stable  in the long run. All in all, the a priori 
information  seemed inadequate  to Sims to identify the equation  as an 
explanation  of markup  behavior  rather  than as a description  of the be- 
havior  of other  elements  that enter  into the determination  of the markup. 